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Abstract. Asymmetric password based key exchange is a key exchange protocol where a client and
a server share a low entropic password while the server additionally owns a high entropic secret for a
public key. There are simple solutions for this (e.g. Halevi and Krawczyk (ACM TISSEC 1999) and its
improvement by Boyarsky (CCS 1999)). In this paper, we consider a new threat to this type of protocol:
if a server’s high entropic secret gets compromised (e.g., due to cryptanalysis, virus attack or a poor
management), the adversary might quickly break lots of passwords and cause uncountable damage. In
this case, one should not expect the protocol to be secure against an off-line dictionary attack since,
otherwise, the protocol is in fact a secure password-only key exchange where the server also only has a
password (by making the server high entropic secret public). Of course a password-only key exchange
does not suffer from this threat as the server does not have a high entropic secret at all. However,
known password-only key exchange are not very efficient (note: we only consider protocols without
random oracles). This motivates us to study efficient and secure asymmetric password key exchange
that avoids the new threat. In this paper, we first provide a formal model for the new threat, where
essentially we require that the active adversary can break ℓ passwords in αℓ|D| steps (for α < 1/2)
only with a probability negligibly close to exp(−βℓ) for some β > 0. Then, we construct a framework
of asymmetric password based key exchange. We prove that our protocol is secure in the usual sense.
We also show that it prevents the new threat. To do this, we introduce a new technique by abstracting
a probabilistic experiment from the main proof and providing a neat analysis of it.
1 Introduction
Key exchange (KE) is one of the most important issues in secure communication. It helps two com-
municants to securely establish a common session key, with which the subsequent communication
can be protected. In the literature, there are two types of key exchange. In type one, two parties
own high entropic secrets (e.g., a signing key of a digital signature). This type has been extensively
studied in the literature; see a very partial list [2,25,7,10]. Type two is password authenticated key
exchange, in which it is assumed that the two parties share a human-memorable (low entropy)
password. The major threat for this type of key exchange is an off-line dictionary attack. In this
case, an adversary can catch a function value of the password (say, F (pw)). Since the password
space is small, he can find the matching password through an exhaustive search. See [1] for an
example. In the literature, two types of password key exchange protocols are studied. In the first
type, two parties only own a common password. This type is studied extensively in the literature.
In the second type, the client and server share a password while the server additionally owns a
high entropic private key of a public key. In this type, there are simple solutions [16,6]. In this
paper, we consider a new threat to this type of protocols: when the server high entropic secret is
compromised, the attacker might quickly break lots of passwords and cause uncountable damage.
It is desired that the pace he breaks passwords is very slow. Under this, the server management will
have enough time to realize and defend the attack. Unfortunately, previous protocols (e.g., [16,6])
is not secure against this threat.
1.1 Related Work
The server key leakage problem does not occur in the password-only key exchange protocol since
in this setting the server does not own a high entropic secret key at all. Hence, an asymmetric
password key exchange against this threat is meaningful only if we have a construction that is more
efficient than the known password-only protocols. Password-only key exchange was first studied by
Bellovin and Merritt [4] and further studied in [5,19,27]. The first provably secure solution is due
to Bellare et al. [3] but security holds in the random oracle model which is not our main focus.
The first key exchange without random oracles are due to Goldreich and Lindell [13]. But it is
very inefficient. The first reasonably efficient solution without random oracles is KOY protocol [21]
which has 15 exponentiations for each party. This protocol was abstracted into a framework by
[11] and improved by Gennaro [12](the contribution of the latter is to remove the signature). Jiang
and Gong [20] (recently abstracted into a framework by [24]) constructed an efficient protocol,
where using the fastest CCA2 secure encryption [18] it costs 5 exponentiations for a client and 6
exponentiations for a server. Katz and Vaikuntanathan [22] constructed a one-round password-only
key exchange but less efficient than [20,24].
Asymmetric password based technique was initiated by Gong [14]. Halevi and Krawczyk [15]
(also full version [16]) proposed a very efficient asymmetric password based key exchange, which
essentially let the client use a CCA2 secure encryption to encrypt the password information. Using
encryption [18], this protocol only needs about two exponentiations for the client and one exponen-
tiation for the server. It was later improved by Boyarsky [6] for security in the multi-user setting.
However, neither of two protocols can prevent the new threat above because the password is en-
crypted under a server public key and can be adversely decrypted without a dictionary attack if
the private key is leaked.
1.2 Contribution
We first provide a formal model for the above server key leakage problem. It essentially requires that
an adversary can break ℓ passwords in αℓ|D| steps (for α < 1/2) only with probability negligibly
close to exp(−βℓ) for some β > 0. Under this assertion, the adversary can not quickly break a
lots of passwords. Then, we construct a framework of asymmetric password based key exchange.
Our construction is based on a tag-based projective hash family that is modified from projective
hash family (tag-PHF) of Cramer-Shoup. We show that our framework is secure in the multi-
user setting of [6] (under a different formalization, where our approach is a new quantification on
the authentication failure). Our proof does not rely on the random oracles. We also prove that our
framework is persistent, where we introduce a new technique to achieve this, which is a probabilistic
experiment extracted from the main proof. We provide a neat analysis for this experiment. Our
persistency holds in the random oracle model. It is open to construct a protocol whose security
and persistency both hold without random oracles. We instantiate our framework with a concrete
tag-PHF. Our realization only costs 4 exponentiations for the client and 2 exponentiations for the
server, which is significantly more efficient than all the known password-only key exchange.
Notions. For a set S, x← S samples x from S randomly; A|B means concatenating A with B. We
use negl : N→ R to denote a negligible function: for any polynomial p(x), limn→∞ negl(n)p(n) =
0. Probability distance of two random variables A,B over set Ω is defined as
dist[A,B] =
1
2
∑
v∈Ω
|Pr[A = v]− Pr[B = v]|.
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For a ∈ N, define [a] = {1, · · · , a}. PPT means probabilistic polynomial time.
2 Security Model
In this section, we introduce a security model for asymmetric password key exchange, which is
slightly modified from the password-only setting of Bellare, et al. [3]. Before proceeding, we first
give some notions.
− D: a password dictionary. For simplicity, assume D = {1, · · · , N} with a uniform distribution.
But our result holds without the uniformity.
− Client Ci and Server S: Asymmetric password key exchange runs between a client Ci and a
server S. S has a public key Θ and a private key θ. He also shares a password πi with Ci. Θ is
known to all clients.
− Πℓii and ΠℓSS : Πℓii is a protocol instance li within client Ci, where ℓi is unique within Ci for
distinguishing different instances in Ci but it is not necessarily globally unique. Similarly, Π
ℓS
S
is a protocol instance ℓS within Server S. In this paper, by a general Π
ℓU
U , we mean U is either
S or some client i.
− Flowi: The ith message in the protocol execution.
− sidℓUU : session identifier of ΠℓUU , where U is either a client i or server S. This variable is defined
for security analysis only. Essentially, if two instances are jointly executing a protocol then they
have the same sid. sid is clear only when the protocol description is available.
- skℓUU : session key defined by instance Π
ℓU
U .
− pidℓUU : the party ΠℓUU presumably interacts with.
- statℓUU : session state of Π
ℓU
U . Simply, it is the intermediate data (other than the long term
secret) necessary for the remaining execution of ΠℓUU . If Π
ℓU
U finishes successfully, by default
stat
ℓU
U = (U, pid
ℓU
U , sk
ℓU
U ).
- Client(ΠℓUU ) : For any Π
ℓU
U , either U or pid
ℓU
U (but not both) is some client. Hence, it is
well-defined if we use Client(ΠℓUU ) to denote this client.
Partnering. ΠℓUU and Π
ℓV
V are partnered if (1) pid
ℓU
U = V and pid
ℓV
V = U ; (2) sid
ℓU
U = sid
ℓV
V .
Adversarial Model. There are n clients C1, · · · , Cn and a Server S. A client Ci will be initialized
with a random password πi ∈ D, which is shared with his server S. Server S, besides owning all
clients’ passwords, additionally has a high entropic public key Θ and a private key θ. Θ is also
available to all clients. An adversary can fully control the network. He can inject, modify, block
messages. He can also request any session key. Formally, his behaviors are modeled as access to the
following oracles.
Execute(i, ℓi, S, ℓS). When this oracle is called, a protocol execution between Π
ℓi
i and Π
ℓS
S takes
place. Finally, a complete message transcript is returned. This oracle call models an eavesdropping
attack. Note, literately, it can be replaced by a sequence of Send queries blow. But it is defined
separately by requiring that Execute queries should not increase adversary success probability.
Send(d, U, ℓU ,M). Upon this query, M is sent to Π
ℓU
U as Flowd. The output is whatever Π
ℓU
U
returns. By default, when d = 0, M = null. This query models active attacks.
Reveal(U, ℓU ). When this oracle is called, session key sk
ℓU
U (if any) is returned. it models a session
key loss attack.
3
Corrupt(i). Upon this query, Ci’s password πi as well as his session states {statℓii }ℓi is given to
adversary. After this, his role will be taken by adversary. This query models a break-in attack or
insider attack. We assume S is never corrupted (although a weak corruption of S will be considered
when defining persistency in the next subsection).
Test(U, ℓU ). This query is a security test for session key sk
ℓU
U . The adversary is allowed to query
it only once. The queried session must have successfully completed. Throughout the game, U and
pid
ℓU
U should not be corrupted; Π
ℓU
U and its partnered instance (if any) should not be issued a
Reveal query. When Test oracle is called, it flips a fair coin b. If b = 1, then skℓUU is provided to
adversary; otherwise, a random number of the same length is provided. The adversary then tries
to output a guess bit b′. If b′ = b, he will be informed Success; otherwise, Fail.
We now define the protocol security, which considers three properties: correctness, authentica-
tion and secrecy.
Correctness. If two partnered instances accept, they derive the same session key except for
negligible probability.
Authentication. If some ΠℓUU , with U and pid
ℓU
U uncorrupted, has successfully completed while
it does not have a unique partnered instance, then we say authentication is broken, denoted by
event Non-Auth. Note that since the password dictionary D is small, one can always break the
authentication by guessing a client’s password and impersonating him to S (through Send queries).
Hence, if an adversary makes at most Q Send queries, we can only hope that Pr[Non-Auth] =
Q/|D|+negl(κ). However, this requirement is not enough. Boyarsky [6] discussed an authentication
problem against [15] which does not violate this requirement. Intuitively, in his attack, an adversary
first obtains a transcript tr between Ci and S; then he corrupts Cj and obtains πj; next he, in the
name of Cj, communicates with S under the help of tr. The last stage is launched many times and
finally it can obtain πi and hence can impersonate Ci successfully. The significance of this attack
is that a malicious Cj can break another user’s password just through repeated attempts to login
his own account. In this case, the rule that N consecutive failures of login results in his account
closure can be easily defeated during his attack, by N − 1 malicious login attempts followed by
one correct login. We remark that this attack does not occur in a password-only key exchange
essentially because the server only has a password and hence when Cj attempts to key exchange
with S in his own name, the server’s answer can be computed by himself. That is, an interaction
with S in his own name is useless. To address the above attack, we consider the authentication
between Client Ci and Server S for each i individually. Define Non-Authi to be the event Non-
Auth such that the client in this event is Ci. Obviously, Non-Authi, i = 1, · · · , n are mutually
disjoint and ∨ni=1 Non-Authi=Non-Auth. Our authentication property is to require that for each
i, Pr[Non-Authi] ≤ Qi/|D| + negl(κ), where Qi is the number of Send(d, U, ℓU , ·) queries such
that Client(ΠℓUU ) = i. Under our definition, interactions between Cj and S are not counted into Qi
and hence can not increase the probability to break πi.
Secrecy. An adversary can succeed in a Test session. Denote this event by Succ. Since Non-
Auth already implies a break of the protocol, we only consider Succ under ¬Non-Auth. As an
adversary has a naive success of probability 1/2, we require Pr[Succ(A)|¬Non-Auth] < 1/2 +
negl(κ).
Note it is crucial to properly define session id sid (hence partnership) so that we do not classify
secure protocols as insecure. For instance (see [20]), if we define a complete protocol transcript as
a session id, then any protocol is insecure since as long as we hold the last message, Non-Auth
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occurs. More subtleties of defining sid and partnership can be seen in [8]. Now we are ready to state
the security definition.
Definition 1. Let Qi be ♯ of Send(d, U, ℓU , ·) queries such that i = Client(ΠℓUU ). Then, an asym-
metric password key exchange protocol is secure if
• Correctness.
• Authentication. Pr[Non-Authi] ≤ Qi|D| + negl(κ),∀i.
• Secrecy. Pr[Succ(A) | ¬Non-Auth] < 1/2 + negl(κ).
Note if Q is ♯ of Send queries, then Q =
∑n
i=1Qi. Hence, authentication in Definition 1 implies
that Pr[Non-Auth] < Q|D|+negl(κ). This futher indicates that Pr[Succ(A)] < 1/2+ Qs2|D|+negl(κ),
which is the security definition [3] for the password-only key exchange.
2.1 Persistency against Server Key Leakage
We now formalize the security when the server high entropic key gets compromised. This threat
is possible due to cryptanalysis, virus attack or a poor management. In this case, we can not
hope the protocol is secure against an off-line dictionary attack as otherwise the protocol is in
fact a secure password-only protocol (by making the server secret public). We thus consider a
weaker guarantee: the adversary should not be able to quickly break lots of passwords. Under this
assertion, the manager will have enough time to realize and defend the attack. We remark that
previous protocols [15,16,6] do not prevent this threat since they essentially encrypt a password
using the servery pub key.
It is desired that if an attacker intends to break ℓ passwords, he has to do so using an dictionary
attack individually on each password and in average costs ℓ|D|/2 dictionary guesses. Quantitatively,
if any adversary runs T < αℓ|D| steps, then he can break ℓ passwords with probability at most
exp(−βℓ) + negl(κ) for some β > 0, where one step is essentially the cost of one dictionary guess
and will be defined when the protocol description is available. Also note that since ℓ does not
necessarily depend on the security parameter κ, we can not simply require the above adversarial
success probability be negl(κ). We notice that it is hard to tell whether an adversary has broken
a password πi or not. Hence, we can not directly use this definition. However, if this occurs, it
should be easy for him to successfully impersonate client i, in which case Non-Authi occurs. Hence,
we instead define the adversary success as the occurrence of Non-Authi for at least ℓ different i.
Finally, we define the adversary capability. Since persistency only considers a attack that occurs
under a very rare circumstance and continues in a short time, oracle queries other than Send are
immaterial. We thus formally define the persistency as follows.
Definition 2. ℓ ∈ N and α < 1/2. Ξ is an asymmetric password-based key exchange protocol,
where D is the password dictionary and (Θ, θ) is the server’s public key and private key pair. Then
Ξ is persistent if for any PPT adversary A that runs T < ℓα|D| steps with access to Send oracles,
Non-Authi occurs to ℓ different i with probability at most exp(−βℓ) + negl(κ) for some β > 0,
where a basic step is specified in a concrete protocol.
3 Tag-Based Hash Proof System
In this section, we introduce a tag-based hash proof system, revised from the original hash proof
system [9] (in fact the brief introduction in [11] suffices) by adding a tag. Special forms of hash
proof system are used by [24,23,22,11,12] to construct password-only key exchange protocols.
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3.1 Subset Membership Problem
A hard subset membership problem essentially is a problem that one can efficiently sample a hard
instance in it. Formally, a subset membership problem I is a collection {In}n∈N, where In is a
distribution for a random variable Λn that can be sampled in polynomial time:
• Generate a finite non-empty set Xn, Ln ⊆ {0, 1}poly(n) s.t. Ln ⊂ Xn, and distribution D(Ln)
over Ln and distribution D(Xn\Ln) over Xn\Ln.
• Generate a witness setWn ⊆ {0, 1}poly(n) and a NP-relation Rn ⊆ Xn×Wn such that x ∈ Ln if
and only if there exists w ∈Wn s.t. (x,w) ∈ Rn. x← D(Ln) can be sampled in polynomial time
and the sampling procedure also outputs a witness w ∈Wn s.t. (x,w) ∈Wn.We use x w← D(Ln)
to denote this procedure. When w is not a concern, we omit it. Further, x← D(Xn\Ln) can be
also sampled in polynomial time.
Finally denote Λn = 〈Xn, Ln,Wn, Rn,D(Ln),D(Xn\Ln)〉. I = {In}n∈N is called a hard subset
membership problem if for 〈Xn, Ln,Wn, Rn,D(Ln),D(Xn\Ln)〉 ← In, x and y are indistin-
guishable when y ← D(Xn\Ln), x← D(Ln).
3.2 Tag-based Projective Hash Function
Let Λ = 〈X,L,W,R,D(L),D(X\L)〉 be sampled from a hard subset membership problem In.
Consider a tuple Ψ = 〈H,K,X,L,G, S, α〉, where G,S,K are finite but non-empty sets, H =
{Hk(·, ·) | k ∈ K} is a set of functions from X × {0, 1}∗ to G and α : K → S is a deterministic
function. K is called a key space, k ∈ K is called the projection key; S is called the projection space
for α. Ψ is called a tag-based projective hash function (tag-PHF) for Λ if for any x ∈ L and tag
z ∈ {0, 1}∗, Hk(z, x) is uniquely determined by α(k), z, x. It is called an efficient tag-PHF if α(k)
and Hk(z, x) are both polynomially computable from (k, x, z) and if Hk(z, x) also is polynomially
computable from x,w, α(k), z where (x,w) ∈ R. In this paper, by tag-PHF, we mean an efficient
tag-PHF.
The following notion of computational universal2 is slightly revised from [17], which in turn
is extended from the notion of universal2 by relaxing the statistical indistinguishability to the
computational indistinguishability.
Definition 3. Λ = 〈X,L,W,R,D(L),D(X\L)〉 ← In, where {In}n is a hard subset membership
problem. Ψ = 〈H,K,X,L,G, S, α〉 is a tag-based projective hash function for Λ. Ψ is computa-
tional universal2 if any PPT A only has a negligible advantage in the following game. Take k ← K
and provide (Ψ, α(k)) to A. A can do the following.
- A can adaptively query (z, x) ∈ {0, 1}∗ ×X to an Evalu oracle, where oracle Evalu is defined
as follows. It checks if x ∈ L (maybe in exponential time). If yes, return Hk(z, x); otherwise ⊥.
- A can ask once to compute some (z1, x1) ∈ {0, 1}∗ ×X\L. In turn, he will receive Hk(z1, x1).
- A can ask once to test some (z2, x2) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × X\L for (z2, x2) 6= (z1, x1). In turn, he will
receive Kb, where b← {0, 1},K0 = Hk(z2, x2) and K1 ← G.
Finally, A outputs bit b′ for guessing b and succeeds if b′ = b.
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3.3 A Useful Lemma
{Iκ}κ is a hard subset membership problem. Take Λ = 〈X,L,W,R,D(L),D(X\L)〉 ← Iκ. Define
a tag-based PHF Ψ = 〈H,K,X,L,G, S, α〉 for Λ, where G = {0, 1}2κ. Take k ← K as a private key,
pk = (α(k), desc(Ψ)) as a public key where desc(Ψ) is the description of Ψ . Let MAC : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}κ be a message authentication code with key space {0, 1}κ. Consider the following game
between a PPT adversary A and a challenger, where A receives pk and challenger keeps k. Let
Θ = {} and c← {0, 1}.
• Challenge Query. A can adaptively query with any tag z. Upon this, challenger takes
x
w← L, lets (a0, s0) = Hk(z, x), (a1, s1) ← {0, 1}2κ, returns (x, ac, sc) and updates Θ = Θ ∪
{(z, x, ac, sc)}.
• Compute Query. A can adaptively query with (z, x, σ,m). If (z, x, a′, s′) ∈ Θ for some a′, s′,
let a = a′, s = s′; otherwise, let (a, s) = Hk(z, x). If σ = MACa(m), return (a, s); otherwise ⊥.
At the end of the game, A outputs a guess bit c′ for c. He succeeds if c′ = c.
Denote this game by ℜ. The lemma below states that A only has a negligible advantage (see
Appendix A for proof).
Lemma 1. {Iκ}κ is a hard subset membership problem, Ψ is computational universal2 and MAC
is existentially unforgeable. Then Pr[Succ(A)] = 1/2 + negl(κ).
4 Red Ball Experiment
We consider an experiment: there are n boxes, where each box contains a identical balls except for
a color difference, where one of them is colored red while the remaining a−1 balls are colored white.
Algorithm A adaptively draws t balls from these boxes. Each time it chooses a box and then draws a
ball uniformly randomly from it without replacement. Let ℓ ∈ {1, · · · , n}. We use ΘAt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an)
to denote the success probability that algorithm A draws t balls (from these boxes) such that ℓ of
them are red, where box i initially contains ai balls including one red. When the red ball in the
box is taken, set ai=0 since A knows all are white in this box and does not need to draw any ball
from it any more. Let Θt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an) = maxAΘAt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an). It is easy to see that for any
permutation (a′1, · · · , a′n) of (a1, · · · , an), Θt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an) = Θt,n,ℓ(a′1, · · · , a′n) holds. We prove the
following important lemma, where the proof is by induction. Due to the page limit, the details are
in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. If 1 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ . . . ≤ an, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, t ≥ 0, then
Θt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an) = Pr
[ ℓ∑
i=1
xi ≤ t : xi ← [ai]
]
. (1)
Theorem 1. If t < αℓa and α < 0.5, then
Θt,n,ℓ(a, · · · , a) < exp(−2(0.5 − α)2ℓ).
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Ci(πi) S(πi, θ)
x
w
← D(L), y = T(πi, x)
(k0, k1) = Hθ(i, x) using w
τ0 = MACk0(Ci|S|y)
Ci | y | τ0
//
x = T∗(πi, y), ζ ← {0, 1}
κ
(k′0, k
′
1) = Hθ(i, x) using θ
τ0
?
= MACk′
0
(Ci|S|y)
ω = Ci|S|y|ζ, τ1 = MACk′
0
(ω|1)
ω = Ci|S|y|ζ, τ1
?
= MACk0(ω|1)
τ2 = MACk0(ω|2), output sk = k1
S | τ1 | ζ
oo
τ2
// τ2
?
= MACk′
0
(ω|2), output sk = k′1
Fig. 1. Password Key Exchange Framework HPS-PAKE (details in the bodytext)
Proof. By Lemma 2, Θt,n,ℓ(a, · · · , a) equals
Pr[x1 + · · ·+ xℓ ≤ t]
= Pr[
∑ℓ
i=1 xi
ℓ − a2 ≤ −(a2 − tℓ)]
∗≤ exp(−2δ2ℓ/a2), δ = a2 − tℓ > (0.5 − α)a
≤ exp(−2(0.5 − α)2ℓ),
where inequality (∗) holds since E[xi] = a2 and the Hoefding inequality. 
5 Our PAKE Framework
We now introduce our client-server password key exchange framework. Let I = {Iκ}κ be a hard
subset membership problem and Λ = (X,L,W,R,D(L),D(X\L)) ← Iκ. Ψ = (H,K,X,L,G, S, α)
is a tag-based projective hash family for Λ, where G = {0, 1}2κ. D = {1, · · · , N} is the set of all
possible passwords with uniform distribution. We say T,T∗ : D×X → X are a regular transformation
pair if they are efficiently computable and also satisfy the following.
R-1. For any fixed π ∈ D, T∗(π,T(π, x)) = x, ∀x ∈ X. i.e., T∗(π, ·) is the inverse function of
T(π, ·).
R-2. For any y ∈ X, there is at most one π ∈ D such that T∗(π, y) ∈ L.
MACk : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ is a secure message authentication code. The setup is as follows. For
the server S, take θ ← K and compute Θ = α(θ). θ will be the private key for S and Θ will be
his public key. Θ is known to all clients. For each client Ci, take πi ← D as the password for Ci,
shared with S. Ci stores Θ publicly and πi secretly. S stores πi, θ secretly and Θ publicly. The key
exchange protocol between S and Ci is carried out as follows (also see Fig. 1), where we assume
that y ∈ X has been verified but in Section 8 we will remove this condition with almost zero price
for a concrete and efficient realization of our framework.
1. Ci takes x
w← D(L). Then he uses πi to compute y = T(πi, x), computes (k0, k1) = Hθ(i, x)
using w, x,Θ, and generates τ0 = MACk0(Ci|S|y). Finally, he sends Ci|y|τ0 to server S. Ci sets
his session state stat = Ci|S|y|k0|k1.
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2. Receiving Ci|y|τ0, server S uses πi to de-transform y back to x = T∗(πi, y), computes (k′0, k′1) =
Hθ(i, x) using (θ, x). He then verifies if τ0
?
= MACk′
0
(Ci|S|y). If no, reject; otherwise, he takes
ζ ← {0, 1}κ and computes τ1 = MACk′
0
(ω|1) for ω = Ci|S|y|ζ. Finally, he sends S|τ1|ζ to Ci. S
sets his session state stat = Ci|S|y|ζ|k′0|k′1.
3. Upon S|τ1|ζ, Ci verifies if τ1 ?= MACk0(ω|1) for ω = Ci|S|y|ζ. If no, reject; otherwise, he
computes and sends τ2 = MACk0(ω|2) to S and outputs session key sk = k1. Ci updates
stat = Ci|S|sk.
4. Upon τ2, Server S verifies if τ2
?
= MACk′
0
(ω|2). If no, reject; otherwise, output session key
sk = k′1. S updates stat = Ci|S|sk.
Remark. We outline how some attacks are prevented in order to better understand our protocol.
(1) against impersonation attack. If attacker impersonates Ci to generate and send Flow1 =
Ci|y|τ0 to S, then since he does not know πi and hence T∗(πi, y) ∈ L with probability 1/|D|.
When x := T∗(πi, y) 6∈ L, τ0 will be rejected since (k0, k1) = Hθ(i, x) appears random to the
attacker. (2) against insider attack (as in [6]). When a malicious Cj eavesdrops a transcript
tr = Ci|y|τ0|S|τ1|ζ|τ2 between Ci and S, then he executes the protocol with S in the name of
himself but using tr as a help. Toward this, he might send Flow1 = Cj |y|τ∗0 to S and hope to receive
a response from the latter. τ∗0 is acceptable only if τ
∗
0 = MACk∗0(Cj |S|y), where (k∗0 , k∗1) := Hθ(j, x∗)
for x∗ = T∗(πj, y). The only useful information is τ0 which is computed using (k0, k1) := Hθ(i, x) for
x = T∗(πi, y). However, no matter πj = πi or not, we have that (i, x
∗) 6= (j, x) as i 6= j (this is the
main reason we use tag-HPS instead of HPS in this paper). This allows us to claim that
k∗0 and k0 are computationally independent. If x 6∈ L, this is automatically true by computational
universal2 definition. In our protocol, even if x ← D(L), this computational independency still
holds; otherwise, one can simply reduce to break the hardness of L. Thus, S will always reject τ∗0 .
Since this rejection occurs without considering the value of πi, it follows that the candidate space
of π in view of adversary does not reduce. (3) session key secrecy. The session key sk = k1 is
computed by (k0, k1) = Hθ(i, x). Client Ci can compute this since he knows the witness w of x ∈ L
and server S can compute this since he knows πi (for recovering x from y) and θ for (k0, k1). Any
outsider can not compute (k0, k1) since given x and Θ, Hθ(i, x) is indistinguishable from random,
which is implied by Lemma 1.
6 Security
In this section, we prove the security of our protocol. Before this, we define the session id in the
protocol as sidℓUU = Ci|S|y|ζ, where U is the client i or server S. Since the password πi for Ci and
S and θ are both fixed after the system initiation, Hθ(i, x) is determined for given Ci|S|y. Hence,
two partnered parties must have the same session key. It remains to consider the authentication
and secrecy, which we will prove using a game-hopping approach.
Theorem 2. I = {Iκ}κ is a hard subset membership problem. MAC : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ is an
existentially unforgeable message authentication code. Ψ is computational universal2 for I. (T,T∗)
is a regular transformation pair. Then HPS-PAKE is secure.
Proof. We modify the security game (denoted by Γ rea) into games Γ0(= Γ
rea), Γ1, Γ2 such that
any adversary view (hence event Non-Authi or Succ as they are in the adversary view) between
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each neighboring pair are negligibly close. For simplicity, we regard Execute query as a result of 4
Send queries (i.e., Send(d, ·), d = 0, 1, 2, 3) and later will remove its effect on Non-Authi and Succ
by analyzing these special Send queries. For simplicity, we assume the Normal condition: sampling
x ← D(L) never repeats the same x (otherwise, we can break the hardness of I: given challenge
x, sample y ← D(L). Then x = y for x← D(L) holds non-negligibly while x 6= y always holds for
x← D(X\L)).
Game Γ1. We modify Γ0 to Γ1 with the following differences. Send(0, i, ℓi, null) oracle defines
(k0, k1)← {0, 1}2κ (instead of (k0, k1) = Hθ(i, x)). Γ1 maintains a list Q of record (i, y, k0, k1). For
consistency, Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0) is handled as follows. First check if (i, y, u0, u1) ∈ Q for some
(u0, u1). If no, process normally using θ; otherwise, define (k
′
0, k
′
1) = (u0, u1) and proceed normally.
Lemma 3. View(A, Γ0) ≈ View(A, Γ1).
Proof. If the views of A are distinguished by D, we construct adversary B to violate Lemma 1.
Upon desc(Ψ), Θ = α(θ), B simulates Γ0 as follows. Let Q = {}.
Send(0, i, ℓi, null). Upon this query, B issues a Challenge query with tag i and in turn receives
(x, ac, sc). He defines (k0, k1) = (ac, sc) and normally finishes the simulation in this query. Finally,
he define stateℓii = Ci|S|y|k0|k1 and update Q = Q∪{(i, y, k0, k1)}. Note in this case, the challenger
of B will update his list Ω = Ω ∪ {(i, x, k0, k1)}.
Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0). Upon this query, compute x = T∗(πi, y). Then, he issues Compute query
(i, x, τ0, Ci|S|y). In turn, he will receive (a, s). If (a, s) =⊥, he rejects; otherwise, define (k′0, k′1) =
(a, s) and finishes the remaining simulation in this query normally. In the later case, also update
stat
ℓS
S = Ci|S|y|ζ|k′0|k′1. Note if x was generated in Send(0, i, ·), then (i, x, ac, sc) ∈ Ω. In this
case, the simulation is consistent with Γc: if τ0 = MACac(Ci|S|y), then Compute oracle returns
(a, s) = (ac, sc); otherwise, it returns (a, s) =⊥ (and B will correctly reject τ0). If x is not generated
in Send(0, i, ·) (note it could be generated by Client i′ 6= i), then (i, x, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Ω and hence τ0 will be
verified by the challenger of B using (k0, k1) = Hθ(i, x) computed using θ. In this case, (a, s) =⊥ if
τ0 is invalid; (a, s) = (k0, k1) otherwise. Hence, in any case, the simulation in this query is perfectly
consistent with Γc.
Send(2, i, ℓi, S|ζ|τ1) Upon this case, use statℓii to simulate normally. Finally, if τ1 is accepted,
update statℓii = Ci|S|k1.
Send(3, S, ℓS , τ2) Upon this case, use stat
ℓS
S to simulate normally. Finally, if τ2 is accepted, update
stat
ℓS
S = Ci|S|k′1.
Reveal(U, ℓU ) and Test(U, ℓU ). This occurs only when Π
ℓU
U is successfully completed. In this
case, skℓUU is well defined in stat
ℓi
i above. Hence, the simulation is normal.
Corrupt(i) As seen above, statℓii is well defined and πi is known. Hence, the simulation is normal.
From the description of B, we can see that when challenge bit c = 0, the simulated game by B
is Γ0; otherwise, it is Γ1. Hence, the distinguishability between Γ0 and Γ1 leads to violate Lemma
1. 
Game Γ2. We modify Γ1 to Γ2 as follows. In oracle Send(0, i, ℓi, null), take x ← X (instead of
x← L). Note since w is not used in the simulation of Γ1, no further change is required toward the
consistency with this modification. By simply reducing to hardness of L, we have
Lemma 4. View(A, Γ1) ≈ View(A, Γ2).
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We analyze Γ2. Recall that, in Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0), when (i, y, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Q, we define (k′0, k′1) =
Hθ(i, x) and verify τ0 with k
′
0. Consider a Bad event in this query: (i, y, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Q and T∗(πi, y) 6∈ L
but τ0 is valid. We show
Lemma 5. Pr[Bad(Γ2)] = negl(κ).
Proof. Assume the lemma is not true. Let an irregular query be a Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0) query
where (i, y, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Q and T∗(πi, y) 6∈ L. Let ♯ of irregular queries be bounded by ν. Use Badi to
represent the event: the ith irregular query is the first Bad event. Note when Bad occurs, there
exists a unique Badi event.
We now construct an adversary A′ to break the computational universal2 property of Ψ. Upon
desc(Ψ), Θ, A′ takes t← {1, · · · , ν} and initializes πi for each Ci and simulates Γ2, except when he
needs to use θ, which is one of the following scenarios (especially note (k0, k1) in Send(0, ·) is taken
randomly in {0, 1}2κ without using θ). (1) S is corrupted and θ should be given to A. This will
not occur since we assume S is uncorrupted; (2) in Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0), A′ will use θ to compute
(k′0, k
′
1) in case of (i, y, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Q. In this case, A′ can compute x = T∗(πi, y) and query his Evalu
oracle to compute Hθ(i, x). When x ∈ L, he will receive Hθ(i, x); when x 6∈ L, he will receive ⊥ .
For the former case, he proceeds normally; for the latter case, it is an irregular query. If this is
the jth irregular query for j < t, then he rejects τ0; if it is the tth irregular query, he issues (i, x)
as a challenge query, in turn he will receive (ac, sc) for challenge bit c. If τ0 = MACac(Ci|S|y), he
outputs 0; otherwise 1. First of all, when c = 1, ac is independent of the adversary view prior to
the current query, by unforgeability of MAC, τ0 = MACa1(Ci|S|y) holds negligibly only. We ignore
this tiny probability. When c = 0 and t is correct, the adversary view till the current query is
identical to his view in Γ2. In this case, validity of τ0 is a Badt event, in which A′ must output 0.
Since Badt event implies that τ0 is valid and that upon such an event the simulation by A′ prior
to the tth irregular query is identical to Γ2. (Even without considering the output of A′ in the
case c = 0 with an incorrect t), we always have that |Pr[A′Evalu(0,·) = 0] − Pr[A′Evalu(1,·) = 0]| ≥
Pr[Badt(Γ2)]− negl(κ) ≥ Pr[Bad(Γ2)]ν − negl(κ), non-negligible, contradiction! Here we use the fact
that when t is random and thus Pr[Badt(Γ2)] = Pr[Bad(Γ2)]/ν. 
For simplicity, we now assume that Bad event never occurs.
Lemma 6. If initiator Π
ℓ∗i
i accepts Flow
∗
2 = S|ζ∗|τ∗1 , it must have a unique partner Π
ℓ∗
S
S .
Proof. Recall that sid
ℓ∗i
i = Ci|S|y∗|ζ∗. Since S will not sample the same ζ∗ twice, except for a
negligible probability (which we ignore), it follows that the number of partnered instance Π
ℓ∗S
S for
Π
ℓ∗i
i is at most one. It suffices to prove the existence of such Π
ℓ∗
S
S . If it does not exist, we show MAC
is forgeable. Assume stat
ℓ∗i
i after sending Flow1 is Ci|S|y∗|k∗0 |k∗1 . Then, reviewing the definitions
of oracles in Γ2, besides computing MACk∗
0
() function, k∗0 (and its identical copy k
∗′
0 ) will be used
only in the following scenarios before Π
ℓ∗i
i verifies Flow
∗
2: k
∗
0 is revealed due to the corruption of
Ci (note S is uncorrupted), which is impossible since a corrupted party is controlled by A and so
Send(2, i, ℓ∗i , F low
∗
2) query would not have occurred). Hence, prior to verifying Flow2 by Π
ℓ∗i
i , Γ2
uses k∗0 only for evaluating MACk∗0(). To reduce to the unforgeability of MAC, it suffices to show
that prior to verifying Flow∗2 in Π
ℓ∗i
i , the simulator never evaluates and outputs MACk∗0 () with
input Ci|S|y∗|ζ∗|1. Otherwise, since τ0, τ1, τ2 have different input formats, this evaluation must be
done by S in Send(1, S, ℓS , ·) for some ℓS , which already implies that Πℓss is partnered with Ci,
contradiction to our assumption. Thus, validity of τ∗1 implies breaking MAC. 
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Lemma 7. Assume that pid
ℓ∗S
S (:= Ci) is uncorrupted. If (i, y
∗, ·, ·) ∈ Q in Send(1, S, ℓ∗S , Ci|y∗|τ∗0 )
oracle and τ∗2 is accepted in Send(3, S, ℓ
∗
S , τ
∗
2 ), then Π
ℓ∗
S
S has a unique partnered Π
ℓ∗i
i for some ℓ
∗
i .
Proof. ♯ of such Π
ℓ∗i
i is at most one, by Normal condition on x. It suffices to prove the existence of
Π
ℓ∗i
i . Assume this is not true. By assumption, in Send(1, S, ℓ
∗
S , Ci|y∗|τ∗0 ), it holds that (i, y∗, k∗0 , k∗1) ∈
Q for some k∗0 , k∗1 and it also holds that τ∗0 = MACk∗0(Ci|S|y∗) (otherwise, τ∗0 in Flow1 was rejected
and it would be impossible for Π
ℓ∗
S
S to verify and accept τ
∗
2 ). Hence, the fact that (i, y
∗, k∗0 , k
∗
1) was
recorded in Q implies that Πℓ∗ii for some ℓ∗i must have sampled x = T∗(πi, y∗). By Normal condition,
Π
ℓ∗i
i is the only instance that samples this value. Since Π
ℓ∗i
i is not partnered with Π
ℓ∗S
S , Π
ℓ∗i
i does not
computeMACk∗
0
() with input Ci|S|y∗|ζ∗|2, where ζ∗ is generated by Πℓ
∗
S
S . As in the previous lemma,
k∗0 is only used in evaluating MACk∗0 (). To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that the simulator
never evaluates and outputs MACk∗
0
() with input Ci|S|y∗|ζ∗|2. Otherwise, it must be done by an
instance Πℓii in Ci in generating Flow3 (recall inputs for τ0, τ1, τ2 have different formats). Hence,
since Ci|S|y∗ implies Πℓii samples x = T∗(πi, y∗). It follows that ℓi = ℓ∗i , contradicting that Π
ℓ∗i
i
is not partnered with Π
ℓ∗S
S . Hence, if Π
ℓi
i does not exist, then Π
ℓ∗S
S ’s accepting τ
∗
2 implies a MAC
forgery, contradicting MAC security! 
Lemma 8. Recall Succ be the success of A in the test session. Then, Pr[Succ | ¬Non-Auth] = 1/2
in Γ2.
Proof. Let Π
ℓ∗
U
U be the test instance and pid
ℓ∗
U
U = V . Let sid
ℓ∗
U
U = CJ |S|y∗|ζ∗. Then, {U, V } = {J, S}.
If U = J , then V = S and (by Lemma 6) there is the unique partnered Π
ℓ∗S
S for Π
ℓ∗J
J . If U = S,
then V = J . In this case, if it does not exist a partnered Π
ℓ∗
J
J in CJ for Π
ℓ∗
S
S , then Π
ℓ∗
S
S ’s accepting
τ∗2 implies Non-AuthJ event. Hence, under ¬Non-Auth event, there is a partnered Π
ℓ∗J
J for Π
ℓ∗S
S and
by Normal condition it is unique. So in any case, conditional on ¬Non-Auth, there is a uniquely
partnered Π
ℓ∗
V
V for Π
ℓ∗
U
U . Let (k
∗
0, k
∗
1) be the uniformly random keys defined to replace Hθ(J, x
∗)
where x∗ = T∗(πJ , y
∗). Let b ∈ {0, 1}, α1 ∈ {0, 1}κ be the random number in Test oracle. We notice
that in Γ2, sk
ℓ∗
U
U = k
∗
1 is taken uniformly random from {0, 1}κ. Let α0 = sk
ℓ∗
U
U . Let the randomness
in the whole game for Γ2, except k
∗
1, b, α1, be denoted by r. Use Viewt(A) to denote the adversary
view after the tth query. Then to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that Viewt(A) for each t is
deterministic in r, αb. We actually also show that {statℓii }(i,ℓi)6=(J,ℓ∗J ),(S,ℓ∗S) is also deterministic in
r, αb. Initially, View0(A) is public parameters and the conclusion trivially holds. Assume it is true
for t− 1 queries. Consider query t.
Send(0, i, ℓi, null). The randomness in sampling x and the randomness for k0 is from r. Hence, Ci|y|τ0
is deterministic in Viewt−1(A) and the randomness r. statℓii = Ci|S|y|k0|k1. When (i, ℓi) 6= (J, ℓ∗J),
k1 is determined by r. Hence, the conclusion holds after this query.
Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0). Oracle first checks if (i, y, ∗, ∗) ∈ Q. If yes, extract k0 from it and proceed
normally (using randomness in r if needed). If no, compute (k′0, k
′
1) = Hθ(i, x) for x = T
∗(πi, y)
and proceed normally. Notice the component (i, y, k0) in a record from Q is computed using the
randomness r; ζ is generated using r too. θ is based on the randomness in the initialization of
Γ2 and hence based on r too. So adversary view in this query is deterministic in Viewt−1(A) and
r. If it outputs Flow2, then stat
ℓS
S is updated as Ci|S|y|k0|k1. By the uniqueness of ℓ∗S, when
(S, ℓS) 6= (S, ℓ∗S), k1 is computing with r. Hence, the conclusion holds after this query.
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Send(2, ·) and Send(3, ·) is deterministic in the view of A before the query and its session state. By
the induction, the conclusion holds after this query.
Reveal(i, ℓi). This query is sk
ℓi
i . By the restriction on Test definition, Π
ℓi
i 6= Π
ℓ∗S
S ,Π
ℓ∗J
J and hence
by induction, its internal state is deterministic in Viewt−1(A) and r, αb. Since skℓii is in his internal
state, the conclusion holds after this query.
Corrupt(i). Upon this query πi as well as {statℓii }ℓi will be available to A. Since i 6= J, S by Test
restriction, by induction, the conclusion holds after this query.
Test(u, ℓ∗u). Reply in this query is αb. The conclusion holds trivially after this query.
As a summary, after any query, our conclusion holds. Hence, adversary view is independent of
b. 
Lemma 9. Pr[Non-Authi(A, Γ2)] ≤ Qi|D| + negl(κ).
Proof. To prove the lemma, we show how to simulate Γ2 when the randomness for {πi}i is unfixed
while the remaining randomness in the game is fixed. Let Di be the probability space for πi after
each oracle query. We will simulate Γ2 such that after each query, the adversary view is identical for
each (π1, · · · , πn) ∈ D1 ×D2 × · · · × Dn. Hence, given the adversary view, (π1, · · · , πn) is uniformly
distributed over D1 × · · · × Dn.
Initially, the adversary is given 〈desc(Λ), α(θ)〉 which is independent of π1, · · · , πn. Hence, D1 =
· · · = Dn = D. Assume this simulation is done for query t − 1. Consider query t, which is one of
the following.
Send(0, i, ℓi, null). Oracle takes y ← X, (k0, k1) ← {0, 1}2κ and computes τ0 = MACk0(Ci|S|y).
Finally, update Q = Q ∪ {(i, y, k0, k1)}. The adversary view in this query is Ci|y|τ0. For any
{πj}nj=1 ∈
∏n
j=1Dj, the adversary view in the current query is identical. By induction assumption,
after this query, if Dj , t = 1, · · · , n remains unchanged, the conclusion holds. statℓii = Ci|S|y|k0|k1.
Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0). Upon this, if (i, y, k0, k1) ∈ Q, then (regardless of the concrete value for
πi), the oracle will take (k0, k1) from it and finish the remaining simulation in this query normally
and all {Dt} remain unchanged. If (i, y, k0, k1) 6∈ Q, oracle will uses θ and πi to verify τ0 and
announce the success of A if valid and reject otherwise. The analysis for this case is as follows.
1. τ0 is valid for the case T
∗(πi, y) ∈ L. This case occurs only for at most one πi (denoted by
πi(y)) by Regularity Property R-2 of (T,T
∗).
2. τ0 is valid for the case T
∗(πi, y) 6∈ L. This event is a Bad event in Γ2 (negligible, see Lemma
5). Since we already assume this event never occurs after Lemma 5, this case does not exist.
As a summery, item 1 occurs (hence πi = πi(y)) with probability at most 1/|Di| by induction
assumption (since, given Viewt−1(A), vector {πj}j is uniform in
∏
j Dj and especially πi is uniform
in Di); when item 1 does not occur, then the adversary view in this query is identical (i.e., reject)
for any password setup: take πi ∈ Di\{πi(y)} and take πj ∈ Dj for all j 6= i. Hence, in this case,
Dj for j 6= i remain unchanged, Di = Di\{πi(y)} and statℓSS = Ci|S|y|k0|k1 is well defined.
Reveal,Test,Send(2, · · ·),Send(3, · · ·) are all processed only with a session state from Send(0, ·) oracle
or Send(1, ·) oracle, which is well defined as seen above. Hence, the simulation is perfect.
Corrupt(i). In this case, πi is revealed and hence Di is updated to a set of a single value. Notice
that {statℓii }ℓi are consistent with all {πj}j ∈
∏
j Dj by induction. Thus, if we keep Dj unchanged
for j 6= i, then the conclusion still holds.
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Now we consider Non-Authi event. It occurs at either some Π
ℓi
i or Π
ℓS
S with pid
ℓS
S = Ci.
By Lemma 6, it is impossible to the former. For the latter, by Lemma 7, it must hold that
(i, y, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Q in Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0) query and hence item 1 (i.e., πi = πi(y)) must occur
(since item 2 is negligible and ignored). It remains to calculate the probability πi = πi(y) through-
out the game. As analyzed above, it has a probability 1/|Di|, conditional on that previous queries
with Flow1 = Ci|∗ do not have such an event. Hence, as a summery, πi = πi(y) occurs in the
ℓth such a Send(1, S, ·, Ci| · |·) query with probability |D|−1|D| · |D|−2|D|−1 · · · 1|D|−ℓ−1 = 1|D| . We claim
that there are at most Qi Send(1, S, ·, Ci|y|·) queries for fixed Ci such that (i, y, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Q with
Client(ΠℓSS ) = Ci. Indeed, although at the beginning of theorem proof, we decompose Execute
into 4 Send(d, ·) queries, this treatment does not invalidate the above statement: in the special
Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0) query (decomposed from query Execute(i, ℓi, S, ℓS)), (i, y, ∗, ∗) ∈ Q was
recorded by Πℓii in Send(0, i, ℓi, null) (decomposed from the same Execute query). So Non-Authi
does not occur to such a special Send query. Thus, Pr[Non-Authi(A, Γ2)] ≤ Qi|D| . 
We come back to the proof of theorem. Note that Non-Authi and Succ both are in the view
of adversary. Hence, each of them are negligibly close between games Γ0, Γ1, Γ2. By Lemmas 8 and
9, we conclude the theorem proof. 
7 Persistency
In this section, we show that our protocol is persistent against the leakage of server key θ. In our
analysis, we model MAC as a random oracle, which is reasonable (say, if we use HMAC). We first
introduce the following notion.
Definition 4. Hθ : {0, 1}∗ ×X → {0, 1}2κ is a tag-PHF and F : D ×X → X is a deterministic
function. Hθ is locally 1-unique w.r.t. F if for any PPT adversary A, the probability that the
first k bits of Hθ(z, F (π1, y)) and Hθ(z, F (π2, y)) equal, is negligible,where π1, π2 are distinct and
respectively goes over D and (z, y)← A(θ,Θ, π1, π2).
The persistency requires that if the attacker runs T < αℓ|D| basic steps for α < 1/2, then
the probability for him to break the authentication w.r.t. ℓ clients, is small. An authentication
break occurs w.r.t. Ci means that either τ1 is accepted at Send(2, i, ℓi, F low2) while server S never
computes it, or τ2 is accepted at Send(3, S, ℓS , τ2) while Ci never computes it. This intuitively
requires the knowledge of πi to compute k0 (hence τ1, τ2, τ3). In our proof, we maintain and update
the candidate space Di for πi after each oracle query. We show that each query will either identify
πi with probability 1/|Di| for a particular i, or remove one candidate of πi from Di. But in any
case, other Dj is not affected. Thus, an oracle query is similar to red ball experiment in Section 4:
it either hits a password πi (red ball) or remove one incorrect candidate (white ball) for πi. From
Theorem 1, we know that if there are at most T < αℓ|D| coupons, then the probability to draw ℓ
red balls in total is exponentially small. We now proceed to a formal analysis.
Theorem 3. Let MAC : {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ be a random oracle and Hθ() is locally 1-unique
with respect to T∗. Then, HPS-PAKE is persistent, where assume one MAC evaluation is a basic
step.
Proof. We first modify Send(0, ·) oracle such that x← D(X\L) (instead of D(L)). Since Hθ(z, x)
can be computed using θ (known), the revised game can be simulated without difficulty. Thus, the
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probability to break authentication in these two games differs negligibly. Hence, we only need to
focus on the revised game. Assuming the randomness r for the whole game except {πi}, is fixed, we
show how to simulate Send oracle and MAC oracle without specifying {πi}.We denote Di to be the
candidate space for πi, given the current adversary view. We use viewt(A) to denote the adversary
view after t queries. Initially, A receives Θ, desc(Ψ), θ, which is independent of {πi}. Hence, given
view0(A), D1 = · · · = Dn = D. Assume the first t− 1 queries are answered. Consider query t which
is one of the following.
MAC oracle. It maintains a MAC list L consisting of records (x,MAC(x)).
Query m by Simulator. This query always has a format (udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ρ) where ρ = ǫ (empty)
or ζ|1 or ζ|2, where udef−k0 is the random variable k0 (dependent on the random variable πi),
where recall that the randomness other than {πj} is fixed. Note that udef−k0 is determined if
Di has a single element. By default, we assume that when |Di| = 1, the simulator always real-
izes udef−k0 with the determined value. Upon the MAC query, it checks if it has been queried
before. If no, take z ← {0, 1}κ and add ((udef−k0, Ci|S|y|0), z) into L. In any case, return z for
(udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ρ), z) ∈ L as the reply. Note that this query does not change {Dj}. That is, the
simulation is consistent for any assignment {πj} ∈
∏
j Dj .
Query m by A. Upon query m, if m was queried before, find y such that (m, y) ∈ L and return
y. If m was not queried before, do the following. If m can be parsed into a format (u, s) where
s = Ci|S|y|ρ for ρ = ǫ (empty) or ζ|1 or ζ|2, then check whether there exists some π(i, y) ∈ Di
(unique if any, by assumption on Hθ()) s.t. (u, ∗) = Hθ(i,T∗(π(i, y), y)). If π(i, y) exists, check
whether πi = π(i, y) (in this case, ‘=’ occurs with probability 1/|Di| since any {πj}j ∈
∏
j Dj gives
the same adversary view). If yes, Di = {π(i, y)} and set udef-k0 in record (udef-k0, Ci|S|y′|ρ) of L
by the first kbits of Hθ(i,T
∗(π(i, y), y′)); otherwise, set Di = Di\{π(i, y)}. When query m was not
recorded in L, take z ← {0, 1}κ (using random tape r) and add (m, z) into a list L. In any case,
return z for (m, z) ∈ L.
Our MAC simulation above has the property that if any {πi} ∈
∏
iDi (also realizing udef − k0
based on this assignment accordingly) before the MAC query is consistent with adversary view,
then after the MAC query, this still holds for updated {Di}.
Send(0, i, ℓi, null). Upon this, take y ← X. Assume no query (∗, Ci|S|y) was previously issued to
MAC, which is violated with probability |L|/|X| (tiny and ignored!). Query (udef− k0, Ci|S|y) to
MAC oracle and when receiving the reply z, define τ0 = z. Finally, send Ci|y|τ0 to A.
Send(1, S, ℓS , Ci|y|τ0). Upon this, query (udef − k0, Ci|S|y) to MAC oracle and when receiving
the reply z, τ0 is accepted if and only if τ0 = z. If τ0 = z, normally generate Flow1 by querying
(udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ζ) to MAC oracle for computing τ1. Finally send out S|τ1|ζ.
Send(2, i, ℓi, S|y|τ1|ζ). Upon this, verify τ1 by querying (udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ζ|1) to MAC oracle and
if accepted, generate and send out τ2 by querying (udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ζ|2) to MAC oracle.
Send(3, S, ℓS , τ2). Verify τ2 by a query (udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ζ|2) to MAC oracle.
By the definition of MAC, after each query, the adversary view will be consistent with any
{πj}j ∈
∏
j Dj . Our simulation is perfect consistent with the real game.
It important to know that each Send oracle only does not change
∏
j Dj: it only involves a
MAC query from Simulator which does not change
∏
j Dj and the remaining code in Send oracle
does not change it either. Now violation of authentication w.r.t. a client Ci occurs only in two cases:
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• In Send(2, i, ℓi, S|y|τ1|ζ), where τ1 is accepted while tuple (udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ζ|1) was not queried
to MAC oracle by Simulator before this Send query. By treatment of MAC oracle, when |Di| ≥ 2,
no (π,Ci|S|y|ζ|1) for any π ∈ Di is queried to MAC; otherwise, either |Di| = 1 (for case πi = π) or π
was removed from Di (for case πi 6= π). Hence, given adversary view, MAC(udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ζ|1) is
random in {0, 1}κ and hence τ1 will be rejected (ignore the probability 2−κ of acceptance), when πi
is set to any value in Di. This also implies that after this query, {Dj} remains unchanged since for
any assignment {πj} ∈
∏
j Dj the adversary view in this query is identical: reject. When |Di| = 1,
τ1 is of course accepted with probability at most 1/|Di| = 1.
• In Send(3, S, ℓS , τ2) with pidℓSS = Ci, Simulator has never queried (udef−k0, Ci|S|y|ζ|2) to
MAC oracle but τ2 is valid. The analysis is similar to Send(2, ·) above.
Now we evaluate Pr[Succ(A)]. From the above analysis, authentication breaks occurring w.r.t.
ℓ clients implies that |Di| = 1 for these clients. On the other hand, we have shown that Di is
reduced only when A makes some special MAC queries (u, s) that defines π(i, y): if π(i, y) = πi
with probability 1/|Di|; otherwise, Di = Di\{π(i, y)}. Now we can build red ball experiment out
of this event: πi is red ball and π(i, y) is a pick at Box i. π(i, y) hits the red ball with probability
1/|Di|; otherwise, Box i eliminates one white ball π(i, y). Defining π(i, y) involves at least one MAC
computation. Hence, one pick costs at least one basic step. By Theorem 1, within T < αℓ|D| picks,
ℓ red balls are selected with probability at most by exp(−2ℓ(0.5 − α)2). 
8 Realization by Revised Cramer-Shoup Hash Proof System
In this section, we realize HPS-PAKE framework using a tag-HPS, revised Cramer-Shoup hash proof
system [26,9].
• Hard Subset Membership Problem. Sample a prime p = 2q + 1 where q is also a large
prime. Let G be the prime group of Z∗p of order q. Take g1, g2 ← G. The set X = {(gr11 , gr22 ) |
r1, r2 ∈ Zq}. Language L is defined as L = {(gr1 , gr2) | r ∈ Zq}. The witness for (gr1, gr2) ∈ L is r.
D(L) and D(X\L) are uniform distributions over L and X\L, respectively. Witness set W = Zq.
NP-relation R is defined as R = {(r, (u1, u2)) | u1 = gr1, u2 = gr2, r ∈ W}. Hence, the description
desc(Iκ) = (g1, g2, p). This is a hard subset membership problem by Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption in G.
• Tag-based Projective Hash Function Ψ . Let S = G2 and G = {0, 1}2κ. Let key space K =
{(a1, a2, b1, b2) | a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ Zq}. Θ = α(θ) = (Θ1, Θ2) = (ga11 ga22 , gb11 gb22 ), for θ = (a1, a2, b1, b2) ∈
K. Let hλ be a collision resistent hash function from {0, 1}∗ to Zq, indexed by λ← {0, 1}κ. Let KDF
is a key derivation function (e.g., the least half bits of the input) and is not used in the original
HPS [26,9]. For (u1, u2) ∈ X and a tag z, define Hθ(z, (u1, u2)) = KDF(ua1+b1τ1 ua2+b2τ2 ), where
τ = hλ(z, u1, u2). If (u1, u2) = (g
r
1, g
r
2), then Hθ(z, u1, u2) = KDF(u
a1+b1τ
1 u
a2+b2τ
2 )
= KDF((Θ1Θ
τ
2 )
r). So Ψ is a projective hash function and desc(Ψ) = (g1, g2, λ, p). By Lemma 10
below, Ψ is also computational universal2.
• Regular Transformation Pair (T,T∗): For π ∈ D and (u1, u2) ∈ X, define T(π, (u1, u2)) =
(u1, u2g
π
2 ) and T
∗(π, (u1, u2)) = (u1, u2g
−π
2 ). Evidently, regularity property R-1 is satisfied. In
addition, property R-2 is satisfied as long as no π1, π2 ∈ D s.t. π1 ≡ π2 (modp), which is evident
when D = {1, · · · , N} for N < q.
Lemma 10. If hλ is collision-resistant, then Ψ must be computational universal2.
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The proof is similar to [17, Lemma 6.3] and omitted here.
Security. Let HPScs-PAKE denote HPS-PAKE realized by the above tag-HPS. From Theorem 2,
it is secure.
Persistency. Now we consider the persistency of HPScs-PAKE. By Theorem 3, we only need to
show that Hθ(z, x) is locally 1-unique, which is seen in the following lemma.
Lemma 11. If hλ is a random oracle, dist[KDF(V ), Uκ] = ∆ so that (∆ + 2
−κ)N2 = negl(κ),
where V,U are uniform over G, {0, 1}κ respectively. Then, Hθ() is locally 1-unique with respect to
T∗.
Proof. Since b2 is uniform over Zq, we ignore the probability b2 = 0. Let (z
∗, x∗1, x
∗
2) be the
output of A. For any distinct ω1, ω2 ∈ [N ], let A = Hθ(z∗,T∗(ω1, x∗1, x∗2)) = x∗a11 x∗a22 g−ω1a22 ·
(x∗b11 x
∗b2
2 g
−b2ω1
2 )
τ1 , B = x∗a11 x
∗a2
2 g
−ω2a2
2 · (x∗b11 x∗b22 g−b2ω22 )τ2 , where τ1 = hλ(z∗, x∗1, x∗2g−ω12 ) and
τ2 = hλ(z
∗, x∗1, x
∗
2g
−ω2
2 ). As q > N , τ1 and τ2 are independent (in Zq) and
(x∗b11 x
∗b2
2 g
−b2ω1
2 )/(x
∗b1
1 x
∗b2
2 g
−b2ω2
2 ) = g
b2(ω2−ω1)
2
has an order of q. Thus, either B or A is uniformly distributed over G. Assume B has an order
of q. From independence between τ1 and τ2, B is uniformly random over G for fixed A. So by
calculation the first κ bits of KDF(B) and KDF(A) equal with probability ≤ 2∆+2−κ. Since there
are N(N − 1)/2 pairs of (ω1, ω2), by assumption, the lemma follows. 
Efficiency. Client’s cost is dominated by 4 exponentiations for y = (gr1, g
r+π
2 ) and (k0, k1) =
KDF((Θ1Θ
τ
2 )
r). Server’s cost is dominated by 2 exponentiations for (k0, k1) = KDF(u
a1+b1τ
1 u
a2+b2τ
2 )
where y = (u1, u2g
πi
2 ) (note he can store g
πi
2 ). Here we did not count the verification of y ∈ G by S
which needs one more exponentiation. However, we can use a recent technique (from our separate
paper) to slightly modify the protocol so that we can avoid the verification by exponentiation. The
modification for HPScs-PAKE is as follows. In Flow1, instead of sending y = (g
r
1, g
r+πi
2 ), Client
i computes y′ := (y′1, y
′
2) := (g
r/2
1 , g
(r+π)/2
2 ) and let y = (y
′
1
2, y′22) and replace y in the original
Flow1 message by y
′. The remaining specification for Client is unchanged. Correspondingly, Server
computation is as follows. It first recovers y = (y′21, y
′2
2) from y
′ when receiving Flow1 and the
remaining specification in Server is unchanged. Denote the modified protocol by HPS∗cs-PAKE.
The cost for client and server each increases by 2 squarings, which is tiny. Then, the security
of HPScs-PAKE implies the security of HPS
∗
cs-PAKE. The proof uses the fact that for y ∈ G, it
holds that
√
y = y(q+1)/2. The security of HPS∗cs-PAKE is obtained by proving that if there is an
adversary A′ against HPS∗cs-PAKE with success probability prob, then there exists an adversary
HPScs-PAKE with the same success probability. The setup of these two protocols are the same. So
when A receives the setup parameter (desc(Φ), Θ), it forwards to A′. Upon Send query from A′,
the strategy of A is to forward the query from A′ to his own challenger and relay the reply from
the latter back to A′, except y in Flow1 of Send(1, ·) query is replaced by y′ = √y. For remaining
queries Reveal,Corrupt(i),Test from A′, A forwards it to his own challenger and replays the
reply back to A′. From this strategy, we know that whatever A′ breaches HPS∗cs-PAKE, A can do
the same to HPScs-PAKE. Hence, the security of HPS
∗
cs-PAKE follows. Details are omitted here.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Use ℜc to denote ℜ when the challenge bit is c. It suffices to show that Pr[A(ℜ0) = 1] =
Pr[A(ℜ1) = 1] + negl(κ). Let ℜℓ0 denote the variant of ℜ0, where the first ℓ Challenge queries
are answered as in ℜ1 while the remaining such queries are answered as in ℜ0. Let ♯ of Challenge
queries be bounded by N. Then, ℜ00 = ℜ0 and ℜN0 = ℜ1. If the lemma is violated by A, then by
hybrid argument, there exists ℓ such that |Pr[A(ℜℓ−10 ) = 1] − Pr[A(ℜℓ0) = 1]| is non-negligible.
Let ℜˆi0, i = ℓ− 1, ℓ be the variant of ℜi0 such that in the ℓth Challenge query, x← X\L (instead
of x ← L), where correspondingly Hk(z, x) is computed using k. By reduction to the hardness of
I, we have Pr[A(ℜi0) = 1] = Pr[A(ℜˆi0) = 1] + negl(κ). Hence, Pr[A(ℜˆℓ−10 ) = 1] − Pr[A(ℜˆℓ0) = 1]
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is non-negligible. We build an adversary D that uses A to break computationally universal2 of Ψ.
Upon public key pk = (α(k), desc(Ψ)), D invokes A with pk and simulates ℜˆℓ0 with it as follows.
He defines c to be the hidden bit in his challenge key Kc (parsed as (a
∗
c , s
∗
c) in this proof).
• ith Challenge Query with z from A. If i 6= ℓ, take x w← D(L) and compute (a0, s0) = Hk(z, x)
using w. The remaining simulation in this query is normal as in ℜˆℓ0. If i = ℓ, he takes x∗ ←
D(X\L) and sets (z, x∗) to be his test pair (z2, x2). In turn, he will receive Kc (parsed as
(a∗c , s
∗
c)) and then he forwards to A. Then, he updates Θ = Θ ∪ {(z, x∗, a∗c , s∗c)}.
• Compute Query (z, x, σ,m). If (z, x, a′, s′) ∈ Θ for some a′, s′, verify σ using a′; otherwise, he
issues Evalu query to his challenger with (z, x) and in turn receives (a, s). If (a, s) =⊥ (hence
x 6∈ L) or σ 6= MACa(m), he outputs ⊥; otherwise, he outputs (a, s).
At the end of game, D outputs whatever A does.
Denote the simulated game of D with bit c by ℜ¯ℓ−c0 . Then ℜ¯ℓ−c0 is identical to ℜˆℓ−c0 , except
in the case of x 6∈ L in Compute query. In this case, the challenger of D returns (a, s) =⊥ and
D will output ⊥ too while in ℜˆℓ−c0 , σ will be verified using a in (a, s) = Hk(x) and (if valid)
(a, s) is returned. Hence, inconsistency between the two games occurs only if the following event
occurs to some Compute query (z, x, σ,m) in ℜ¯ℓ−c0 : (z, x, ∗, ∗) 6∈ Θ and x 6∈ L but σ = MACa(m).
Denote this event by E. we have that |Pr[A(ℜˆℓ−c0 ) = 1] − Pr[A(ℜ¯ℓ−c0 ) = 1]| ≤ Pr[E(ℜ¯ℓ−c0 )]. We
claim that Pr[E(ℜ¯ℓ−c0 )] = negl(κ), c = 0, 1; otherwise, computational universal2 of Ψ can be broken
by adversary D′ as follows. W.O.L.G, assume Pr[E(ℜ¯ℓ0)] is non-negligible. Upon receiving pk, D′
simulates ℜ¯ℓ0 by playing the role of D and the challenger of D, where pk is the public key, except the
evaluation of Hk(z, x) is done under his own challenger’s help. Specifically, for the ith Challenge
query for i 6= ℓ, he can take x← L and compute Hk(z, x) with w himself ; For the ℓth Challenge
query, he takes x∗ ← X\L and asks his challenger to evaluate Hk(z, x∗) as the first challenge
(i.e, (z1, x1) in Definition 3); upon a Compute query (z, x, σ,m), he asks his own challenger with
(z, x) and in turn he will receive (a, s) =⊥ if x 6∈ L; Hk(z, x) otherwise. In case of the former,
he records (z, x) in to a list L and reject normally (as in ℜ¯ℓ−c0 ); in case of the latter, answer the
query using the received Hk(z, x) normally. The remaining simulation is normal. This simulation
is perfectly consistent with ℜ¯ℓ−c0 for both cases c = 0 and 1. At the end of game, if c = 1 (since
we only consider ℜ¯ℓ0, not ℜ¯ℓ−10 ), he outputs 0/1 randomly; otherwise, he takes (z∗, y∗) randomly
from L and ask (z∗, y∗) as his test challenge (i.e., (z2, x2) in Definition 3). In turn he will receive
(a∗b , s
∗
b), where (a
∗
0, s
∗
0) = Hk(z
∗, y∗) or (a1, s1)← {0, 1}2κ. Then he reviews all the Compute queries
in L with forms (z∗, y∗, σ,m) for any σ,m and denote event σ = MACa∗
b
(m) by inc. In case of inc,
output 0; otherwise output 1. Note if b = 1, then inc occurs to y∗ negligibly by ungorgeability of
MAC. If b = 0, then inc event is E event in ℜ¯ℓ0 occurs to (z∗, y∗). Since any E event must occur
to some (z, x) in L, inc occurs in D’s algorithm for b = 0 with probability at least Pr[E(ℜ¯ℓ0)]/|L|,
non-negligible. The non-negligible gap of the two cases implies non-negligible advantage of D′,
contradiction. Hence, Pr[A(ℜ¯ℓ0) = 1] − Pr[A(ℜ¯ℓ−10 ) = 1] is non-negligible, which is the success
advantage of D, contradiction. 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Use Left and Right to denote the left and right side of Eq. (1) respectively. First of all,
we show Left ≥ Right by presenting an algorithm A0 achieving Right. A0 simply draws the ball
from Box 1 until the red ball is picked. Then, he turns to Box 2 using the same strategy, then Box
3, · · ·. If he draws a red ball from Box ℓ before t picks are used up, he succeeds; otherwise, he fails.
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Let the red ball in Box i be obtained by using xi picks. Then, it is simple to verify that xi ← [ai].
Hence, the success probability of A0 is exactly the right side of Eq. (1).
It remains to show that Left ≤ Right. When ℓ = 0, the conclusion holds trivially since both
sides are 1. Assume ℓ ≥ 1. When n = 1, two sides of Eq. (1) equal min{t/a1, 1} for the (only) case
ℓ = 1. For n ≥ 2 and ℓ ≥ 1. we use induction on t. Note Θt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an) can always be achieved
by a deterministic algorithm by computing the maximum success probability over the randomness
of A. Hence, we assume a deterministic A achieves it. When t = 0, two sides of Eq. (1) are zero.
The conclusion holds trivially. When t = 1, assume the first box chosen by A is j. Then
Θ1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an)
= a−1j · Θ0,n,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, 0, aj+1, · · · , an)
+(1− a−1j )Θ0,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= a−1j · Θ0,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an)
+(1− a−1j )Θ0,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an)
If ℓ = 1, then this gives Θ1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an) = a−1j ≤ a−11 = Right. Hence, Left ≤ Right.
If ℓ ≥ 2, since Θ0,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an) = 0 and
Θ0,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an) = 0,
we have that Θ1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an) = 0. In addition, since x1 + · · · + xℓ ≥ ℓ > 1, Right = 0. Hence,
Left = Right.
Now assume Left ≤ Right for t− 1, which implies Left = Right for t− 1 since Left ≥ Right
is proven at the beginning. We consider t (t ≥ 2). Assume the first box chosen by A is j. Then,
Θt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an)
= a−1j ·Θt−1,n,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, 0, aj+1, · · · , an)
+(1− a−1j )Θt−1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= a−1j ·Θt−1,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an)
+(1− a−1j )Θt−1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an)
There are two cases.
Case aj = 1: In this case, we have Θt,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , an) =Θt−1,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an).
Let a∗1, · · · , a∗ℓ−1 be ℓ− 1 smallest numbers among {a1, · · · , an}\{aj}. By induction,
Θt−1,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an) = Pr [x∗1 + · · ·+ x∗ℓ−1 ≤ t− 1 : x∗i ← [a∗i ]]. (2)
If j > ℓ, then a1 = · · · = aℓ = 1 as a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an. Hence, (a∗1, · · · , a∗ℓ−1) equals (a1, · · · , aℓ−1).
Therefore,
Pr [
∑ℓ−1
i=1 x
∗
i ≤ t− 1 : x∗i ← [a∗i ]] = Pr [
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai]]. Since aℓ = 1, it follows
that xℓ = 1 always holds when xℓ ← [aℓ]. So Pr [
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai]] = Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t :
xi ← [ai]]. The induction holds in this case.
If j ≤ ℓ, then {a∗1, · · · , a∗ℓ−1} = {a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , aℓ}. Hence,
Pr [
∑ℓ−1
i=1 x
∗
i ≤ t− 1 : x∗i ← [a∗i ]]
= Pr [
∑
1≤i≤ℓ,i 6=j xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai]]
= Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t : xi ← [ai]],
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where the last ‘=’ holds since aj = 1 and hence xj = 1 holds always. Hence, the induction holds in
this case too.
Case aj > 1 and j > ℓ: In this case, {a1, · · · , aℓ−1} are ℓ−1 smallest numbers in {a1, · · · , an}\{aj}.
By induction assumption on t− 1, we have
a−1j ·Θt−1,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= a−1j · Pr [
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai]]
In addition, if aj > aℓ, {a1, · · · , aℓ} are ℓ smallest numbers in {a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an}.
Hence,
(1− a−1j )Θt−1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= (1− a−1j ) · Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai]]
Therefore, in Eq. (1), we have that Right− Left equals
Pr[
ℓ∑
i=1
xi = t] + a
−1
j · Pr[
ℓ∑
i=1
xi ≤ t− 1]− a−1j · Pr[
ℓ−1∑
i=1
xi ≤ t− 1] (3)
We need to show Right − Left ≥ 0. We split event ∑ℓ−1i=1 xi ≤ t − 1 into two sub-events A :
(t − 1 ≥)∑ℓ−1i=1 xi ≥ t − aℓ and B :
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t − 1 − aℓ. Note in case of event A, there exists
1 ≤ x∗ℓ ≤ aℓ such that x∗ℓ +
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi = t. Hence, Pr[
∑ℓ
i=1 xi = t]− Pr[A] ≥ Pr[
∑ℓ
i=1 xi = t ∧ xℓ =
x∗ℓ ] − a−1j Pr[A] = a−1ℓ Pr[A] − a−1j Pr[A] ≥ 0. In case of event B, since xℓ ≤ aℓ always holds,
a−1j Pr[B] ≤ a−1j Pr[
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1]. Hence, Right ≥ Left holds in this case.
If aj ≤ aℓ, then aj = aℓ since by assumption aj ≥ aℓ for j > ℓ holds always. In this case,
{a1, · · · , aℓ−1, aℓ − 1} are ℓ smallest numbers among {a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an}. Hence,
(1− a−1j )Θt−1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= (1− a−1ℓ ) · Pr [x∗ℓ +
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai], x∗ℓ ← [aℓ − 1]]
= (1− a−1ℓ )
∑aℓ−1
u=1 Pr [x
∗
ℓ +
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1 ∧ x∗ℓ = u : xi ← [ai], x∗ℓ ← [aℓ − 1]]
= a−1ℓ
∑aℓ−1
u=1 Pr [u+ 1 +
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t : xi ← [ai], i < ℓ]
=
∑aℓ−1
u=1 Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t ∧ xℓ = u+ 1 : xi ← [ai], i ≤ ℓ]
= Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t ∧ xℓ > 1 : xi ← [ai]]
Further, a−1j ·Θt−1,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= a−1ℓ · Pr [
∑ℓ−1
i=1 xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai]]
= Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t ∧ xℓ = 1 : xi ← [ai]]. Combining the above two equations, we have that in
this case Left = Right.
Case aj > 1 and j ≤ ℓ: In this case, {a1, · · · , aℓ}\{aj} are ℓ − 1 smallest numbers among
{a1, · · · , an}\{aj}. By induction assumption on t− 1, we have
a−1j ·Θt−1,n−1,ℓ−1(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= a−1j · Pr [
∑
1≤i≤ℓ,i 6=j xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai]]
= Pr [
∑
1≤i≤ℓ xi ≤ t ∧ xj = 1 : xi ← [ai]]
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Note {a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , aℓ} are the ℓ smallest in {a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an}.
Hence,
(1− a−1j )Θt−1,n,ℓ(a1, · · · , aj−1, aj − 1, aj+1, · · · , an)
= (1− a−1j ) Pr [x∗j +
∑ℓ
i=1,i 6=j xi ≤ t− 1 : xi ← [ai], x∗j ← [aj − 1]]
= (1− a−1j )
∑aℓ−1
u=1 Pr [x
∗
j +
∑ℓ
i=1
i 6=j
xi ≤ t− 1 ∧ x∗j = u : xi ← [ai], i 6= j, x∗j ← [aj − 1]]
= a−1j
∑aℓ−1
u=1 Pr [u+ 1 +
∑ℓ
i=1,i 6=j xi ≤ t : xi ← [ai], i 6= j]
=
∑aℓ−1
u=1 Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t ∧ xj = u+ 1 : xi ← [ai]]
= Pr [
∑ℓ
i=1 xi ≤ t ∧ xj > 1 : xi ← [ai]]
Combining the above two equations, we conclude the result in this case.
As a summary, the induction holds for all cases. This completes the proof. 
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